‘Case of the Week’ 6 (Stoa): Withdraw TNWs

Important Disclaimer: We pretty much just throw these together over the weekend, and don’t put a lot of work into them. Case of the Week cases are not subject to the same editorial process and stringent quality standards as the COG 2012 sourcebook, and are frequently contributed by non-COG authors. You may find material and sources in these cases that would not appear in the sourcebook. That said, we hope these cases will be useful to you; enjoy!

About the Author: Daniel Gaskell is the developer of the popular Factsmith research software and the lead editor of COG 2012. He debated in the NCFCA and Stoa for six years, qualifying to both NCFCA Nationals and NITOC multiple times. Daniel attends Baylor University.

1AC: Withdraw Tactical Nuclear Weapons

By Daniel Gaskell

During the Cold War the United States stationed numerous short-range nuclear weapons in Europe to deter an invasion from Russia. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the weapons no longer served any real purpose – yet, many of them remain in Europe to this day. We believe that this anachronistic policy is harmful to our national security, and that is why my partner and I stand Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its foreign military presence and/or foreign military commitments.

Before we dive into the meat of our case, however, I’d like to make sure we’re all talking about the same thing in…

Part 1: Definitions

The main term that you need to know to understand this round is “tactical nuclear weapon”, or “TNW”:

May 29, 2012, Congressional Research Service, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”, accessed August 25, 2012, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf (page 5)

“The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons reflects the military definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on the other hand, the tactical use of nuclear weapons. According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, a strategic mission is:

“Directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity and will to make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and other such target systems. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces.”

In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined as “the use of nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in support of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area of military operations.”

In other words, a strategic nuclear weapon is typically a long-range nuclear missile that would be used to damage the enemy’s resources, or deter them from attacking us. A tactical nuclear weapon is typically a shorter-range missile or bomb that would be used in a specific battle.

This case does not deal with strategic nuclear weapons. It only deals with tactical nuclear weapons, or TNWs. It has no effect on the U.S.’s broad-scale nuclear deterrent.

Let’s now look at what’s happening in the status quo in…

Part 2: Inherency

About 200 TNWs in five countries

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 14, 15)

Despite many calls to withdraw the few remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, the NATO Strategic Concept itself, approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, basically continued the existing policy.

[later, in the same context:]

The current number of U.S. gravity bombs based in Europe is estimated at around 160-200. These are B61-3 and B61-4 bombs with a destruction power ranging from 0.3 to 170 kilotons, for delivery by U.S. or NATO aircraft, which are deployed in five NATO countries.”

It is the opinion of the Affirmative team that the United States’ placement of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is unnecessary and damages our national security. We’ll explain why in a minute, but first, let’s present:

Part 3: The Plan

Agency & Enforcement: Shall be the President, the Department of Defense, and any other necessary Federal agency.

Mandate: The United States shall unilaterally withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from NATO countries and return them to the mainland United States.

Funding: Shall be through normal military budgets. The plan may save money in the long run.

Timeline: This plan will take effect as soon as possible.

Now, let’s look at why we believe this is a good idea, in…

Part 4: Justifications

Justification 1: Useless

TNWs have no military value whatsoever

Dr. Pavel Podvig (PhD in political science, with other degrees in physics; research associate at Stanford University’s Center for Inernational Security and Cooperation, focusing on the Russian nuclear arsenal and U.S.-Russian relations), February 25, 2010, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “What to do about tactical nuclear weapons”, accessed August 25, 2012, thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons

“I believe, however, that the task of dealing with tactical nuclear weapons would be much easier if we take them for what they are–weapons with no military value whatsoever–instead of trying to balance them with everything else. There is more agreement on this issue than you might think. If there is any consensus in NATO’s “corrosive internal debate,” it’s that the U.S. weapons in Europe are irrelevant militarily.”

Justification 2: Dangerous

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe endangers our national security in two very important ways, as we’ll see in two subpoints:

Point A – Escalation. TNWs make conflicts more likely to escalate into all-out nuclear war

Dr. Nikolai Sokov (PhD, senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation), Prof. William Potter (PhD, professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute; member of the National Academy of Sciences’ Nonproliferation Panel), and Miles Pomper (senior research associate at CNS), December 2009, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, accessed August 25, 2012, cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf (page 9-10)

“Furthermore, employment of TNW is closely associated with conventional forces: both the American extended deterrence and the Russian “de-escalation” strategies foresee conflicts that start as conventional ones that more or less quickly transcend the threshold into limited use of nuclear weapons. The theoretical scenarios of employment of TNW argue for the pre-delegation of launch authority to combatant commanders in the early stages of or perhaps even in the run-up to a conventional war with further decrease of crisis stability, diminished control by political leaders, and the lowering of the nuclear threshold. Thus, in a very direct and tangible way the continued existence of TNW in national arsenals enhances the probability of nuclear war, whether intentional or by accident, and represents a threat to international security.

Point B – Terrorism. TNWs have inadequate security and are inviting targets for terrorists

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 23)

“According to a Blue Ribbon Review set up by the U.S. Air Force in 2008, most U.S. nuclear weapon storage sites in Europe do not meet U.S. Defense Department security standards. The review, extensively covered in the European media, disclosed that nuclear weapons in Europe are regarded by the U.S. Air Force as becoming progressively less important, which leads to diminishing attention by personnel as well as to waning expertise. This is particularly worrisome in view of the existing terrorist threat. As the U.S. ‘gang of four’ claimed in their second Wall Street Journal article: “These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.”

Justification 3: Diplomatic Advantage

The United States isn’t the only country with tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; Russia also has a large arsenal. Removing our nuclear weapons from Europe would remove a major barrier in the way of Russia removing its nuclear weapons, multiplying the effectiveness of our plan. This is important, because Russia’s nuclear weapons are even less secure than ours. Let’s examine this in two subpoints:

Point A – Dangerous Russian Nukes. Russia’s TNWs pose a high risk of terrorism

Dr. Charles D. Ferguson (PhD in physics, prominent scholar in nonproliferation studies and former officer on a ballistic missile submarine; currently president of the Federation of American Scientists) and Prof. William Potter (PhD, professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute; member of the National Academy of Sciences’ Nonproliferation Panel), 2005, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Routledge, “The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism”, ISBN: 04159252441, accessed August 25, 2012, cns.miis.edu/books/pdfs/4faces_ch7.pdf (page 320)

“Today, however, Russia’s smallest nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat. Deployed in part on Russia’s front lones, often under questionable security, and sometimes lacking internal locks to prevent unauthorized use, Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons are far more attractive to terrorists than less portable strategic warheads attached to long-range missiles in secure silos or well-protected mobile missile bases.”

Point B – Withdrawal Helps. Unilateral withdrawal has a “decent chance” of convincing Russian to change their position

Dr. Nikolai Sokov (PhD, senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation), Prof. William Potter (PhD, professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute; member of the National Academy of Sciences’ Nonproliferation Panel), and Miles Pomper (senior research associate at CNS), December 2009, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, accessed August 25, 2012, cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf (page 37)

“There is no guarantee, of course, that unilateral withdrawal of American TNW from Europe would prompt Russia to change its position. It would, however, make it more politically costly for Moscow to continue to stall on the TNW issue and, if Russia continued to refuse to put its TNW on the negotiating table, expose its current position as a bluff. If implemented against the background of positive movement in other issue areas, such as strategic arms reduction, this tactic has a decent chance of success.”

It’s time we recognize that the Cold War is over and withdraw our tactical nukes. In the past, they successfully deterred the Soviets; but today, all they do is bait terrorists and destabilize the world. It’s time to end this anachronism and bring our weapons back where they belong: the United States.

Backup: Withdraw TNWs

INHERENCY

Many NATO allies favor withdrawal, but the U.S. disagrees

Oliver Schmidt (research fellow at the German Council of Foreign Relations, PhD candidate in political science), April 27, 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Utility of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO: A European Perspective”, accessed August 25, 2012, carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/27/utility-of-u.s.-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-nato-european-perspective/7q7

“By February 2010 the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Luxembourg joined Germany’s proposal for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and debated the issue at the NATO meeting in Tallinn. However, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated clearly that there will be no withdrawal without an agreement with Russia about their tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe.”

HARM: TERRORISM/ACCIDENTS

Inherently more vulnerable to theft/accidents – real-world example

Dr. Nikolai Sokov (PhD, senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation), Prof. William Potter (PhD, professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute; member of the National Academy of Sciences’ Nonproliferation Panel), and Miles Pomper (senior research associate at CNS), December 2009, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, accessed August 25, 2012, cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf (page 10)

TNW remains a category of nuclear weapons that is particularly vulnerable to illegal acquisition, theft, or other forms of loss of control by proper authorities. Tactical nuclear weapons – as well as warheads for air-launched strategic weapons (bombs and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, or ALCMs) – are inherently more vulnerable because they are kept at storage facilities. In contrast, the bulk of warheads for lCBMs and SLBMs are permanently mated to delivery vehicles and remain inside silos and submarines (which come with their own built-in defenses of personnel and security systems). In addition, there exist procedures for release of TNW to troops on short notice, which presuppose shortcuts in security procedures. These dangers are usually associated with the Russian TNW arsenal, which is only natural given its size and the well-known security problems it experienced in the 1990s. However the recent Minot incident in the United States, when warheads for ALCMs were unwittingly transported across the country due to a mistake of low-level personnel, demonstrates that this problem is shared by this entire class of nuclear weapons.”

Real-world example: Activists easily break into a TNW base

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 23-24)

“This makes a recent incident even more worrying: at the end of January 2010, peace activists climbed over the fence in Kleine Brogel, walked around inside the base for more than an hour without meeting a soldier, reached the bunkers, video-taped everything, went to the entrance of the base, succeeded in smuggling out the videotape, and posted it on the Internet. If unarmed peace activists are able to accomplish this, others with more malign intentions can undoubtedly do so as well.”

HARM: RUSSIAN TNWs

Unilateral withdrawal “may be necessary” – Russia admits it would help

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 19)

“In addition, the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe may be a necessary condition to convince Russia to take action on their much larger number of tactical nuclear weapons. As a minimum reply to such a unilateral decision from the U.S. side, Russia could reciprocate by moving their tactical nuclear weapons deeper into Russia. Sergey Kislyak, Russian ambassador to the United States, admitted that the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would be a serious factor in changing Russia’s position on consolidating, reducing, or eliminating its tactical nuclear weapons.”

Presence contributes to Russia’s unwillingness to reduce its own TNWs

Dr. Nikolai Sokov (PhD, senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation), Prof. William Potter (PhD, professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute; member of the National Academy of Sciences’ Nonproliferation Panel), and Miles Pomper (senior research associate at CNS), December 2009, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, accessed August 25, 2012, cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf (page 16)

Russian discourse on TNW can be quite misleading. Many publications cite Russian commentators that attach military importance to TNW, but a closer look would reveal that their authors are outside the government and uniformed military. Since strategic planning or rational cost-benefit calculation do not provide an adequate explanation for the Russian refusal to subject their TNW arsenal to reductions, domestic politics is a logical next place to search for an explanation. The Russian government attitude toward TNW appears to represent a complex mix of domestic and bureaucratic politics, (mis)perceptions, and idiosyncrasies. Its main elements could be summarized in the following way:

“No More Unreciprocated Concessions.” The determination to keep a large arsenal of weapons that do not have obvious utility is related to the deep-seated dissatisfaction with what is seen as excessive, unreciprocated concessions during the Gorbachev and early Yeltsin eras. In the present day, giving up any advantage, no matter how illusory, is rebuffed almost by default. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that the United States keeps a limited number of TNW warheads in Western Europe – a capability which, seen from Russia, does not have a logical justification given the overwhelming conventional superiority of the United States and NATO over Russia.”

HARMS: MISCELLANEOUS

Proliferation: Withdrawal helps discourage proliferation

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 19)

“What ElBaradei and other specialists and decision-makers increasingly recognize is that, as long as nuclear weapons states and nuclear alliances cling to nuclear weapons, it will be fundamentally impossible to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. Only in a world without nuclear weapons does the fight against further proliferation have a real chance to be successful. The withdrawal of these weapons would therefore constitute a symbolically meaningful act vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapons states.”

Cost: $200 million per year per base – for something that isn’t even useful

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 24)

The costs of keeping tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are split between the United States and the respective host nations. The United States finances the production, transport, and safe storage of the weapons on the base, and furnishes personnel for maintenance, custody, and safety. The host nations provide land for storage sites and infrastructure for U.S. personnel, and pay for owning and operating the dual-capable aircraft, as well as for the external perimeter security of the base. Because of enhanced security risks after 9/11, the corresponding costs went up considerably, to a level estimated at $120-180 million U.S. The total cost for the United States alone is approximately $200 million U.S. per year per air base. One U.S. military official stated: “We pay a king’s ransom for these things and…they have no military value.“”

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Military Harmed: Operationally irrelevant – other forces massively outweigh

Dr. Micah Zenko (PhD, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; former positions include Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the Brookings Institution, the Congressional Research Service, and the State Department), November 17, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Nukes in Europe Unnecessary”, accessed August 25, 2012, www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/us-nukes-europe-unnecessary/p23427

America’s tactical nuclear umbrella over NATO is no longer vital to European security. In fact, it is operationally irrelevant. And nuclear weapons are useless in defending NATO from plausible current threats–such as attacks on military or civilian infrastructure from terrorist groups, limited probes like the Russia-Georgia border clash in 2008, and cyberattacks such as those Estonia suffered in 2007. Moreover, America’s commitment to protect its allies is already provided by long-range–or “strategic”–nuclear capabilities, conventional firepower, and missile defenses. Assuming the New START Treaty enters into force, the United States will retain a deterrent of 1,550 bombs on a nuclear triad of 420 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 60 long-range bombers, and 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The United States also remains the world’s most powerful conventional military, with unmatched conventional power-projection assets. Finally, the administration is developing missile defenses to protect Europe from missile threats from Iran, or elsewhere, by 2018. Therefore, removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe has little strategic cost to the United States and NATO allies.”

Turkey Proliferation: Turkey says conventional forces are enough

Johan Bergenäs (research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies), March 2, 2010, World Politics Review, “Bombs Away: Removing Tactical Nukes from Europe”, accessed August 25, 2012, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/5202

“A third barrier to removing these weapons is Turkey’s perceived desire to keep them within its territory. However, senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they “would not insist” that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara’s security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.”

Turkey Proliferation: Don’t affect decision much

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 28)

“Furthermore, if Turkey believes that possessing nuclear weapons is of vital interest for the nation, it is doubtful whether the presence of the remaining-and dwindling-number of U.S. nuclear weapons really makes any difference in its calculation.”

European Relations: Little influence anymore

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 26)

Many members of the foreign policy establishment assume that tactical nuclear weapons should stay in Europe because they constitute a quintessential link between the United States and Europe. [lengthy quotation illustrating this position omitted for space] There are several reasons why this logic may no longer apply. First, nuclear coupling may indeed have been a suitable means to link Europe to the United States during the Cold War. Given the changed circumstances of today, however, it is hard to believe that the post-Cold War U.S.-European relationship depends more on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on European territory than it does on a host of other ties, including economic, financial, historical, and social connections.

Lose a Bargaining Chip: Not very useful – Russia would make things complicated

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (PhD in physics, senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) and Prof. Tom Sauer (PhD in international relations, assistant professor of international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium), May 2011, Harvard University, International Security Program Discussion Paper #2011-05, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible”, accessed August 25, 2012, belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf (page 34)

The asymmetrical numbers, however, are a major difficulty. Russia has many more tactical nuclear weapons and will not agree to exchange them for the much lower numbers on the NATO side. In contrast to Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev regards the era of making deeper cuts than the United States as over. Russia may link the tactical nuclear weapons to the strategic nuclear weapons in reserve, a revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, missile defense, or some combination of these. Russia may also want to bring the British and French nuclear weapons into the discussions. Furthermore, there will be more counting issues with the weapons, because such a treaty would not only have to deal with the delivery vehicles but also with the weapons themselves. This means elaborating other verification procedures, including control of storage sites, for the first time. In short, negotiations for a treaty on tactical nuclear weapons will not be easy.”

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